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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
BACKGROUND1 
 
The plaintiff, Neil E. Jones, was employed as a package 
car driver, a union position at the Altoona distribution 
plant of United Parcel Service ("UPS"). Jones's position as a 
package car driver required that he perform "at a constant 
pace during a full work shift" and that Jones have the 
ability "to assist in moving up to 150 lbs - bend, stoop, 
crouch, climb, stand, sit, walk and turn/pivot for up to 9.5 
hours per day, 5 days per week." See Jones v. UPS, No. 96- 
268J, slip op. at 1-2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1999) (herein "slip 
op."). 
 
On December 16, 1988, Jones sustained an injury to his 
back when he slipped and fell on some ice while making a 
delivery. Jones began receiving workers' compensation 
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act 
at the rate of $377 per week. After his accident, Jones 
exited the work-force and enrolled at Pennsylvania State 
University. After two years during which Jones continued to 
receive benefits, a consulting orthopedist released Jones to 
return to work. Jones refused, and in January 1991 UPS 
filed a petition to cease and terminate Jones's benefits, 
which proceeded before a Workers' Compensation Judge 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The following facts are drawn from the undisputed statement of facts 
set forth by the District Court in its memorandum order, and from prior 
decisions in proceedings related to this appeal. 
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("WCJ"). Meanwhile, Jones continued his education and 
ultimately received a B.A. in Heath Policy Administration. 
 
On October 19, 1995, the WCJ granted UPS's petition to 
terminate Jones's workers' compensation benefits. The WCJ 
concluded that Jones had "fully recovered from his work 
injury of December 16, 1988," both mentally and 
physically. In making this determination, the WCJ 
evaluated Jones's testimony and the reports and testimony 
of five physicians, three of whom testified on Jones's behalf. 
Jones appealed to the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation 
Appeal Board. The Appeal Board affirmed the WCJ's 
decision, holding that: 
 
       Overall, based upon the doctor's examination of 
       December 18, 1990, it was the doctor's reasoned 
       medical opinion that [Jones] was fully recovered and 
       was able to return to his pre-injury job without 
       restrictions as of that date. We find Dr. Casale's report 
       and testimony to constitute substantial, competent 
       evidence sufficient to support the WCJ's determination. 
 
See Jones v. United Parcel, 1997 WL 49126 at *4 (Pa. Work. 
Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 5, 1997). 
 
Jones next appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which 
affirmed the Appeal Board's ruling, concluding that "[t]he 
medical expert testimony that United Parcel presented to 
the WCJ amply supports the WCJ's finding that Jones had 
fully recovered from his work-related injuries." Jones v. 
WCAB (United Parcel), No. 590-CD-1997, slip op. at 4 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Nov. 3, 1997). On May 28, 1998, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania denied Jones's petition for appeal. 
 
Before the ruling by the WCJ, Jones had contacted the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
concerning "alleged discriminatory action against a person 
with disabilities." Slip op. at 3. The EEOC advised Jones 
that he must file a charge of discrimination with the local 
EEOC office. Five months later, Jones wrote to the local 
EEOC office. He stated that the "issues involved here 
concern an ongoing workers' compensation case" and that 
his grievance against UPS arose because he did not"feel 
the present offer is a reasonable settlement offer." Id. UPS 
thereafter retained Cascade Rehabilitation Counseling, Inc. 
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to locate alterative employment opportunities at a sedentary 
level for Jones. See id. Although Cascade located numerous 
such sedentary positions in January and February 1995, 
Jones did not accept any of them. See id. at 4. 
 
In September 1996, following the adverse ruling by the 
WCJ but before the conclusion of the lengthy appeals 
process, Jones filed a one count complaint in the District 
Court against UPS, claiming that UPS violated the 
Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") by failing to provide 
him with a reasonable accommodation for his return to 
work. During discovery, Jones continued to assert that he 
was completely incapable of performing his previous duties 
due to his slip-and-fall accident. Jones stated that there 
were no circumstances -- absent UPS providing somebody 
else to do his job for him -- that would enable him to 
perform his package car driver responsibilities or any of the 
other three union positions (tractor-trailer driver, sorter- 
preloader, and package handler) available under the 
collective bargaining agreement between UPS and the 
Teamsters union. At no time did Jones ask anyone at UPS 
for a reasonable accommodation for his alleged disability, 
nor did he ever request a lateral transfer to another non- 
union position at UPS or a promotion to a managerial 
position. See id. at 2-3. 
 
After discovery UPS moved for summary judgment, 
arguing, inter alia, that Jones's ADA claim was barred by 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel or, alternatively, that 
Jones could not demonstrate that he was a qualified 
individual with a disability under the ADA. Jones argued 
that although he was incapable of carrying out his duties 
as a package car driver, UPS violated the ADA because it 
denied him alternative employment opportunities and did 
not reassign him to a vacant position. The District Court 
concluded that "[w]hat is left is a record that is devoid of 
any evidence that there were any equivalent positions to 
which plaintiff could be reassigned as an accommodation. 
Plaintiff himself concedes that he does not know of any 
positions at UPS that he would have been able to perform." 
Id. at 10-11. The District Court therefore granted summary 
judgment for UPS because Jones failed to meet his burden 
of proving that he was a qualified individual under the 
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ADA. In light of this disposition, the District Court did not 
decide whether Jones's ADA claim was barred by the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, although it alluded to the 
issue in a footnote. 
 
Jones filed a timely appeal but died of cancer, unrelated 
to his back injury, during the pendency of this appeal. 
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(a) the executor of his estate, 
Robert E. Jones, has been substituted as appellant. 
 
II. 
 
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331 and we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We engage in plenary review of a 
district court's grant of summary judgment and consider 
the facts in the light most favorable to Jones. See, e.g., 
Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 238 
(3d Cir. 1999). It was UPS's burden to demonstrate that 
there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and 
that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 247 (1986). 
 
III. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Appellant does not contest the findings of fact set forth in 
the District Court's opinion, specifically that Jones, who 
claimed he was incapable of working as a package car 
driver, failed to make any request for an accommodation, 
an alternative equivalent position, or a promotion, and that 
the record is completely devoid of evidence of any 
equivalent position in UPS to which Jones could have been 
reassigned as an accommodation. Appellant contends 
Jones was excused from providing evidence of the existence 
of a reasonable accommodation because UPS failed to 
engage in the interactive process required by 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(o)(3). Appellant cites our decision in Taylor v. 
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Phoenixville School District, 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999), as 
controlling. 
 
UPS responds by reasserting its position that Jones's 
ADA claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 
inasmuch as the WCJ's finding that Jones had completely 
recovered from his back injuries and could return to his 
position as a package car driver has been sustained on 
each of Jones's appeals. UPS also contends that Jones 
cannot establish that he is a qualified individual under the 
ADA as he has admitted that he cannot perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that he held. 
Finally, UPS contends that Jones's reliance on Taylor is 
misplaced as none of the four elements set forth in Taylor 
are present in this case. In particular, UPS contends Taylor 
supports its position because Jones never initiated the 
interactive process by requesting an accommodation. 
 
A. 
 
Collateral Estoppel 
 
We must consider at the outset UPS's position that the 
ADA claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
The parties concede that we must provide the same 
preclusive effect to the WCJ's findings as would the 
Pennsylvania courts. Under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel applies where the following four 
prongs are met: 
 
       (1) An issue decided in a prior action is identica l to one 
       presented in a later action; (2) The prior action resulted 
       in a final judgment on the merits; (3) The party against 
       whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the 
       prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior 
       action; and (4) The party against whom collateral 
       estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to 
       litigate the issue in the prior action. 
 
Rue v. K-Mart Corp., 713 A.2d 82, 84 (Pa. 1998). 
 
The only question at issue here is the first prong of the 
analysis: is the issue decided in the workers' compensation 
proceeding identical to the issue presented here. The WCJ 
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found that Jones had "fully recovered" from his slip-and-fall 
injury, a finding sustained on Jones's various appeals, and 
UPS argues that Jones cannot continue to claim he is 
disabled as a result of that accident. Appellant responds 
that "even if the factual issues were identical, because the 
ADA has different policies, goals and definitions from the 
Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Statute, collateral 
estoppel does not preclude [his] ADA claim." Appellant's 
Reply Br. at 29. 
 
Pennsylvania law in this respect has recently been 
refined. Earlier, in Odgers v. Unemployment Compensation 
Board of Review, 525 A.2d 359 (Pa. 1987), the Court had 
held that a determination that a teacher work action was a 
strike for purposes of a state statute authorizing the court 
to order teachers back to work did not have preclusive 
effect on the characterization of the action for purposes of 
employment compensation because the underlying policies 
and goals of the statutes differed. But more recently, in Rue 
v. K-Mart Corp., 713 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1998), the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court clarified the limits of its holding in Odgers. 
In particular, the Court stated that when the issue before 
the Unemployment Compensation Board is a factual issue, 
differences between the public policies affected by the 
subsequent civil litigations are irrelevant. As the Court 
stated: "A fact is a fact, regardless of public policy." Id. at 
85. The Court then cited with approval several illustrative 
examples of the preclusive effect of factual findings in 
workers' compensation proceedings, including Kohler v. 
McCrory Stores, 615 A.2d 27 (Pa. 1992) (finding of work- 
related injury had preclusive effect in subsequent 
negligence action), Capobianchi v. BIC Corp., 666 A.2d 344 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (finding of no work-related injury had 
preclusive effect in subsequent products liability action), 
and Christopher v. Council of Plymouth Township , 635 A.2d 
749 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (finding of no work-related 
disability had preclusive effect in subsequent action on 
collective bargaining agreement). See Rue, 713A.2d at 87 
n.4. 
 
We predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
follow its decision in Rue under the circumstances here and 
would give preclusive effect to the factual finding of the 
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WCJ in the workers' compensation proceeding that Jones 
was fully recovered from his work-related injury, regardless 
of the differing policies behind the ADA and the Workers' 
Compensation Act. As this prior proceeding resulted in a 
final judgment, to which Jones was a party and had a fair 
and full opportunity to litigate, and indeed litigated it 
through the Pennsylvania courts, Jones is barred by 
Pennsylvania's doctrine of collateral estoppel from 
challenging this factual finding in his ADA claim. We are 
therefore required by 28 U.S.C. S 1738 to consider Jones's 
ADA claim in light of the irrefutable fact that as of 
December 1990 Jones had fully recovered from his work- 
related injury and was able to return to his position as a 
package car driver. 
 
B. 
 
ADA Claim 
 
Because Jones is precluded from re-litigating his recovery 
from the slip-and-fall accident, Jones's ADA claim fails as 
a matter of law. The ADA prohibits covered employers from 
discriminating against a "qualified individual with a 
disability" because of the disability of such an individual. 
See 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). It is, of course, an axiom of any 
ADA claim that the plaintiff be disabled and that the 
employer be aware of the disability. Arguably, Jones may 
have suffered from a different disability (i.e., his 
undiagnosed cancer). However, this contention was never 
presented to the District Court, nor is there any indication 
or even an allegation that UPS was made aware of 
"possible" unrelated disabilities. Furthermore, it is clear 
from Jones's complaint and deposition testimony that the 
core of his ADA claim is the allegation that he remained 
disabled as a result of his 1988 work-related injury and 
that UPS failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for 
that disability. 
 
Jones is under the burden of demonstrating that he has 
a disability under the ADA before any claim can proceed to 
trial. See, e.g., Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 
947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996). At summary judgment, a plaintiff 
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cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go 
beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would 
show that there exists a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). In light of 
Jones's full recovery from his work-related injuries, Jones's 
ADA claim would fail as a matter of law as he has provided 
no other evidence that he was "disabled" under the ADA. 
 
UPS contends that even if the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel were inapplicable in this case, Jones's ADA claim 
nevertheless fails as he admitted there are no reasonable 
accommodations on the part of UPS that would have made 
it possible for Jones to perform his position as a package 
car driver. Appellant does not contest that fact. See 
Appellant's Br. at 21 ("Mr. Jones did not dispute his 
inability to return to his former position of package car 
driver, given his disability."). He insists, however, that the 
only relevant accommodation would have been to transfer 
Jones to a different position at UPS, and that had UPS 
fulfilled its obligation to engage in the interactive process, 
the parties could have identified transfer positions as a 
reasonable accommodation. 
 
The ADA's regulations provide that: "To determine the 
appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary 
for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process 
with the [employee] in need of the accommodation." 29 
C.F.R. S 1630.2(o)(3). The goal of the interactive process is 
to help identify the precise limitations of the employee's 
disability and the potential options that could reasonably 
accommodate those limitations. The EEOC's interpretive 
guidelines establish the circumstances that trigger the 
employer's duty to engage in this interactive process: "Once 
a qualified individual with a disability has requested 
provision of a reasonable accommodation, the employer 
must make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate 
accommodation. The appropriate reasonable 
accommodation is best determined through a flexible, 
interactive process that involves both the employer and the 
[employee] with a disability." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 
S 1630.9 at 361. 
 
Appellant relies on our decision in Taylor v. Phoenixville 
School District, 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999), in support of 
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his argument that UPS failed to engage in the interactive 
process required by the ADA. However, Taylor is 
distinguishable on its facts. Katherine Taylor, the plaintiff, 
had worked as a school principal's secretary for twenty 
years before suffering the onset of bipolar disorder which 
resulted in her hospitalization at a psychiatric institution 
and subsequent leave of absence. Taylor's son informed the 
school that doctors had diagnosed his mother with bipolar 
disorder and told them that she " `would require 
accommodations when she returned to work.' " Id. at 303. 
However, when Taylor returned to work, the school offered 
no accommodation, but instead began documenting her 
errors and eventually terminated her employment. 
 
Taylor filed an ADA action; the district court granted 
summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the only 
accommodation Taylor specifically requested, a transfer to 
another position, was not possible. We reversed, holding 
that Taylor had presented sufficient evidence to create an 
issue of material fact as to whether the school had failed to 
engage in the interactive process. We stated that to show 
that an employer has violated its duty to engage in the 
interactive process, a disabled employee must demonstrate: 
"1) the employer knew about the employee's disability; 2) 
the employee requested accommodations or assistance for 
his or her disability; 3) the employer did not make a good 
faith effort to assist the employee in seeking 
accommodations; and 4) the employee could have been 
reasonably accommodated but for the employer's lack of 
good faith." Id. at 319-320. 
 
Unlike Taylor, Jones never requested an accommodation 
or assistance for his disability; he not only never requested 
to return to his old position as a package car driver, he 
never asked for either one of the other jobs available under 
his union contract or any other position with UPS. 
Appellant nevertheless contends that UPS had "sufficient 
constructive notice of Mr. Jones' desire for 
accommodation," Appellant's Reply Br. at 14, because it 
was aware of Jones's belief that he could not return to his 
former manual labor job and that his disability precluded 
him from returning to work at UPS. We disagree because 
appellant has not provided any evidence to suggest that 
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UPS should have known that Jones sought an 
accommodation. As we stated in Taylor, "while the notice [of 
a desire for an accommodation] does not have to be in 
writing, be made by the employee, or formally invoke the 
magic words `reasonable accommodation,' the notice 
nonetheless must make clear that the employee wants 
assistance for his or her disability." Taylor , 184 F.3d at 
313. The record reflects that the only request made by 
Jones of UPS was for continued payment of disability 
benefits. Because there is no evidence from which a request 
for accommodation could be inferred, UPS was under no 
legal obligation to engage in the interactive process. 
 
IV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
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